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Abstract. In program synthesis there is a well-known trade-off between
concise and strong specifications: if a specification is too verbose, it might
be harder to write than the program; if it is too weak, the synthesised
program might not match the user’s intent. In this work we explore the
use of annotations for restricting memory access permissions in program
synthesis, and show that they can make specifications much stronger
while remaining surprisingly concise. Specifically, we enhance Synthetic
Separation Logic (SSL), a framework for synthesis of heap-manipulating
programs, with the logical mechanism of read-only borrows.
We observe that this minimalistic and conservative SSL extension bene-
fits the synthesis in several ways, making it more (a) expressive (stronger
correctness guarantees are achieved with a modest annotation overhead),
(b) effective (it produces more concise and easier-to-read programs),
(c) efficient (faster synthesis), and (d) robust (synthesis efficiency is
less affected by the choice of the search heuristic). We explain the in-
tuition and provide formal treatment for read-only borrows. We sub-
stantiate the claims (a)–(d) by describing our quantitative evaluation of
the borrowing-aware synthesis implementation on a series of standard
benchmark specifications for various heap-manipulating programs.
1 Introduction
Deductive program synthesis is a prominent approach to the generation of correct-
by-construction programs from their declarative specifications [14, 23, 29, 33].
With this methodology, one can represent searching for a program satisfying the
user-provided constraints as a proof search in a certain logic. Following this idea,
it has been recently observed [34] that the synthesis of correct-by-construction
imperative heap-manipulating programs (in a language similar to C) can be im-
plemented as a proof search in a version of Separation Logic (SL)—a program
logic designed for modular verification of programs with pointers [32,37].
SL-based deductive program synthesis based on Synthetic Separation Logic
(SSL) [34] requires the programmer to provide a Hoare-style specification for a
program of interest. For instance, given the predicate ls(x, S), which denotes a
symbolic heap corresponding to a linked list starting at a pointer x, ending with
null, and containing elements from the set S, one can specify the behaviour of
the procedure for copying a linked list as follows:
{r 7→ x ∗ ls(x, S)} listcopy(r) {r 7→ y ∗ ls(x, S) ∗ ls(y, S)} (1)
? Work done during an internship at NUS School of Computing in Summer 2019.
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The precondition of specification (1), defining the shape of the initial heap,
is illustrated by the figure above. It requires the heap to contain a pointer r,
which is taken by the procedure as an argument and whose stored value, x, is the
head pointer of the list to be copied. The list itself is described by the symbolic
heap predicate instance ls(x, S), whose footprint is assumed to be disjoint from
the entry r 7→ x, following the standard semantics of the separating conjunction
operator (∗) [32]. The postcondition asserts that the final heap, in addition to
containing the original list ls(x, S), will contain a new list starting from y whose
contents S are the same as of the original list, and also that the pointer r will now
point to the head y of the list copy. Our specification is incomplete: it allows, for
example, duplicating or rearranging elements. One hopes that such a program
is unlikely to be synthesised. In synthesis, it is common to provide incomplete
specs: writing complete ones can be as hard as writing the program itself.
1.1 Correct Programs that Do Strange Things
1 void listcopy (loc r) {
2 let x = *r;
3 if (x == 0) {
4 } else {
5 let v = *x;
6 let nxt = *(x + 1);
7 *r = nxt;
8 listcopy(r);
9 let y1 = *r;
10 let y = malloc(2);
11 *(x + 1) = y1;
12 *r = y;
13 *(y + 1) = nxt;
14 *y = v;
15 } }
v y1
x x + 1
v′ …
nxt nxt + 1
…y
r
v nxt
y y + 1
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Fig. 1: Result program for spec (1)
and the shape of its final heap.
Provided the definition of the heap predi-
cate ls and the specification (1), the SuS-
Lik tool, an implementation of the SSL-
based synthesis [34], will produce the pro-
gram depicted in Fig. 1. It is easy to check
that this program satisfies the ascribed
spec (1). Moreover, it correctly duplicates
the original list, faithfully preserving its
contents and the ordering. However, an
astute reader might notice a certain odd-
ity in the way it treats the initial list pro-
vided for copying. According to the post-
condition of (1), the value of the pointer
r stored in a local immutable variable y1
on line 9 is the head of the copy of the
original list’s tail. Quite unexpectedly, the
pointer y1 becomes the tail of the original
list on line 11, while the original list’s tail
pointer nxt, once assigned to *(y + 1) on
line 13, becomes the tail of the copy !
Indeed, the exercise in tail swapping is
totally pointless: not only does it produces
less “natural” and readable code, but the
resulting program’s locality properties are unsatisfactory; for instance, this pro-
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gram cannot be plugged into a concurrent setting where multiple threads rely
on ls(x, S) to be unchanged.
The issue with the result in Fig. 1 is caused by specification (1) being too
permissive: it does not prevent the synthesised program from modifying the
structure of the initial list, while creating its copy. Luckily, the Separation Logic
community has devised a number of SL extensions that allow one to impose
such restrictions, like declaring a part of the provided symbolic heap as read-
only [5, 8, 9, 11,15,20,21], i.e., forbidden to modify by the specified code.
1.2 Towards Simple Read-Only Specifications for Synthesis
The main challenge of introducing read-only annotations (commonly also re-
ferred to as permissions)5 into Separation Logic lies in establishing the disci-
pline for performing sound accounting in the presence of mixed read-only and
mutating heap accesses by different components of a program.
As an example, consider a simple symbolic heap
{
x
M7→ f ∗ r M7→ h
}
that declares
two mutable (i.e., allowed to be written to) pointers x and r, that point to
unspecified values f and h, correspondingly. With this symbolic heap, is it safe
to call the following function that modifies the contents of r but not of x?{
x
RO7→ f ∗ r M7→ h
}
readX(x, r)
{
x
RO7→ f ∗ r M7→ f
}
(2)
The precondition of readX requires a weaker form of access permission for x (read-
only, RO), while the considered heap asserts a stronger write permission (M).
It should be possible to satisfy readX’s requirement by providing the necessary
read-only permission for x. In order to do so, we will need to agree on a discipline
to “adapt” the caller’s write-permission M to the callee’s read-only permission
RO. While seemingly trivial, if implemented na¨ıvely, accounting of read-only
permissions in Separation Logic might undesirably compromise either soundness
or completeness of the logical reasoning.
A number of proposals for logically sound interplay between write- and read-
only access permissions in the presence of function calls has been described in
the literature [7–9, 11, 13, 20, 30]. Some of these works manage to maintain the
simplicity of having only mutable/read-only annotations when confined to the
sequential setting [9,11,13]. More general (but harder to implement) approaches
rely on fractional permissions [8,25], an expressive mechanism for permission ac-
counting, with primary applications in concurrent reasoning [7, 28]. We started
this project by attempting to adapt some of those logics [9,11,13] as an extension
of SSL in order to reap the benefits of read-only annotations for the synthesis
of sequential program. The main obstacle we encountered involved definitions
of inductive heap predicates with mixed permissions. For instance, how can one
specify a program that modifies the contents of a linked list, but not its struc-
ture? Even though it seemed possible to enable this treatment of predicates via
permission multiplication [25], developing support for this machinery on top of
5 We will be using the words “annotation” and “permission” interchangeably.
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existing SuSLik infrastructure was a daunting task. Therefore, we had to look
for a technically simpler solution.
1.3 Our Contributions
Theoretical Contributions. Our main conceptual innovation is the idea of in-
strumenting SSL with symbolic read-only borrows to enable faster and more
predictable program synthesis. Borrows are used to annotate symbolic heaps
in specifications, similarly to abstract fractional permissions from the deductive
verification tools, such as Chalice and VeriFast [20,21,27]. They enable simple
but principled lightweight threading of heap access permissions from the callers
to callees and back, while enforcing read-only access whenever it is required. For
basic intuition on read-only borrows, consider the specification below:{
x
a7→ f ∗ y b7→ g ∗ r M7→ h
}
readXY(x, y, r)
{
x
a7→ f ∗ y b7→ g ∗ r M7→ (f + g)
}
(3)
The precondition requires a heap with three pointers, x, y, and r, pointing to
unspecified f, g, and h, correspondingly. Both x and y are going to be treated as
read-only, but now, instead of simply annotating them with RO, we add symbolic
borrowing annotations a and b. The semantics of these borrowing annotations
is the same as that of other ghost variables (such as f). In particular, the callee
must behave correctly for any valuation of a and b, which leaves it no choice
but to treat the corresponding heap fragments as read-only (hence preventing
the heap fragments from being written). On the other hand, from the perspec-
tive of the caller, they serve as formal parameters that are substituted with
actuals of caller’s choosing: for instance, when invoked with a caller’s symbolic
heap
{
x
M7→ 1 ∗ y c7→ 2 ∗ r M7→ 0
}
(where c denotes a read-only borrow of the caller),
readXY is guaranteed to “restore” the same access permissions in the postcondi-
tion, as per the substitution [M/a, c/b]. The example above demonstrates that
read-only borrows are straightforward to compose when reasoning about code
with function calls. They also make it possible to define borrow-polymorphic
inductive heap predicates, e.g., enhancing ls from spec (1) so it can be used in
specifications with mixed access permissions on their components.6 Finally, read-
only borrows make it almost trivial to adapt the existing SSL-based synthesis
to work with read-only access permissions; they reduce the complex permission
accounting to easy-to-implement permission substitution.
Practical Contributions. Our first practical contribution is ROBoSuSLik—an
enhancement of the SuSLik synthesis tool [34] with support for read-only bor-
rows, which required us to modify less than 100 lines of the original code.
Our second practical contribution is the extensive evaluation of synthesis with
read-only permissions, on a standard benchmark suite of specifications for heap-
manipulating programs. We compare the behaviour, performance, and the out-
comes of the synthesis when run with the standard (“all-mutable”) specifications
and their analogues instrumented with read-only permissions wherever reason-
6 We will present borrow-polymorphic inductive heap predicates in Sec. 2.4.
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able. By doing so, we substantiate the following claims regarding the practical
impact of using read-only borrows in SSL specifications:
– First, we show that synthesis of read-only specifications is more efficient : it
does less backtracking while searching for a program that satisfies the imposed
constraints, entailing better performance.
– Second, we demonstrate that borrowing-aware synthesis is more effective:
specifications with read-only annotations lead to more concise and human-
readable programs, which do not perform redundant operations.
– Third, we observe that read-only borrows increase expressivity of the synthe-
sis: in most of the cases enhanced specifications provide stronger correctness
guarantees for the results, at almost no additional annotation overhead.
– Finally, we show that read-only borrows make the synthesis more robust : its
results and performance are less likely to be affected by the unification order
or the order of the attempted rule applications during the search.
Paper Outline. We start by showcasing the intricacies and the virtues of SSL-
based synthesis with read-only specifications in Sec. 2. We provide the formal
account of read-only borrows and present the modified SSL rules, along with
the soundness argument and its implications in Sec. 3. We report on the im-
plementation and evaluation of the enhanced synthesis procedure in Sec. 4. We
conclude with a discussion of the shortcomings of read-only borrows in Sec. 5
and a comparison to related work in Sec. 6.
2 Program Synthesis with Read-Only Borrows
We introduce the enhancement of SSL with read-only borrows by walking the
reader through a series of small but characteristic examples of deductive syn-
thesis with separation logic. We provide the necessary background on SSL in
Sec. 2.1; the readers familiar with the logic may want to skip to Sec. 2.2.
2.1 Basics of SSL-based Deductive Program Synthesis
In a deductive Separation Logic-based synthesis, a client provides a specifica-
tion of a function of interest as a pair of pre- and post-conditions, such as
{P} void foo(loc x, int i) {Q}. The precondition P constrains the symbolic
state necessary to run the function safely (i.e., without crashes), while the post-
condition Q constrains the resulting state at the end of the function’s execution.
A function body c satisfying the provided specification is obtained as a result of
deriving the SSL statement, representing the synthesis goal :
{x, i} ; {P};{Q}| c
In the statement above, x and i are program variables, and they are explicitly
stated in the environment Γ = {x, i}. Variables that appear in {P} and that are
not program variables are called (logical) ghost variables, while the non-program
variables that only appear in {Q} are referred to as (logical) existential ones (EV).
The meaning of the statement Γ ; {P};{Q}| c is the validity of the Hoare-style
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triple {P} c {Q} for all possible values of variables from Γ .7 Both pre- and
postcondition contain a spatial part describing the shape of the symbolic state
(spatial formulae are ranged over via P, Q, and R), and a pure part (ranged over
via φ, ψ, and ξ), which states the relations between variables (both program
and logical). A derivation of an SSL statement is conducted by applying logical
rules, which reduce the initial goal to a trivial one, so it can be solved by one of
the terminal rules, such as, e.g., the rule Emp shown below:
Emp
` φ⇒ ψ
Γ ; {φ; emp};{ψ; emp}| skip
That is, Emp requires that (i) symbolic heaps in both pre- and post-conditions
are empty and (ii) that the pure part φ of the precondition implies the pure
part ψ of the postcondition. As the result, Emp “emits” a trivial program skip.
Some of the SSL rules are aimed at simplifying the goal, bringing it to the shape
that can be solved with Emp. For instance, consider the following rules:
Frame
EV (Γ,P,Q) ∩ Vars (R) = ∅
Γ ; {φ; P};{ψ; Q}| c
Γ ; {φ; P ∗ R};{ψ; Q ∗ R}| c
UnifyHeaps
[σ]R′ = R ∅ 6= dom (σ) ⊆ EV (Γ,P,Q)
Γ ; {φ; P ∗ R}; [σ]{ψ; Q ∗ R′}∣∣ c
Γ ; {φ; P ∗ R};{ψ; Q ∗ R′}∣∣ c
Neither of the rules Frame and UnifyHeaps “adds” to the program c being
synthesised. However, Frame reduces the goal by removing a matching part R
(a.k.a. frame) from both the pre- and the post-condition. UnifyHeaps non-
deterministically picks a substitution σ, which replaces existential variables in a
sub-heap R′ of the postcondition to match the corresponding symbolic heap R in
the precondition. Both of these rules make choices with regard to what frame R
to remove or which substitution σ to adopt—a point that will be of importance
for the development described in Sec. 2.2.
Finally, the following (simplified) rule for producing a write command is oper-
ational, as it emits a part of the program to be synthesised, while also modifying
the goal accordingly. The resulting program will, thus, consist of the emitted
store ∗x = e of an expression e to the pointer variable x. The remainder is syn-
thesised by solving the sub-goal produced by applying the Write rule.
Write
Vars (e) ⊆ Γ e 6= e′ Γ ; {φ; x 7→ e ∗ P};{ψ; x 7→ e ∗ Q}| c
Γ;
{
φ; x 7→ e′ ∗ P};{ψ; x 7→ e ∗ Q}∣∣ ∗x = e; c
As it is common with proof search, should no rule apply to an intermediate
goal obtained in one of the derivations, the deductive synthesis will back-track,
possibly discarding a partially synthesised program fragment, trying alternative
derivation branches. For instance, an application of UnifyHeaps that unifies
wrong sub-heaps might lead the search down a path to an unsatisfiable goal,
eventually making the synthesis back-track and leading to longer search. Con-
sider also a misguided application of Write into a certain location, which can
7 We often care only about the existence of a program c to be synthesised, not its
specific shape. In those cases we will be using a shorter statement: Γ ; {P}; {Q}.
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cause the synthesizer to generate a less intuitive program that “makes up” for the
earlier spurious writes. This is precisely what we are going to fix by introducing
read-only annotations.
2.2 Reducing Non-Determinism with Read-Only Annotations
Consider the following example adapted from the original SSL paper [34]. While
the example is intentionally artificial, it captures a frequent synthesis scenario—
non-determinism during synthesis. This specification allows a certain degree of
freedom in how it can be satisfied:
{x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 30} void pick(loc x, loc y) {z ≤ 100; x 7→ z ∗ y 7→ z} (4)
It seems logical for the synthesis to start the program derivation by applying the
rule UnifyHeaps, thus reducing the initial goal to the one of the form
{x, y} ; {x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 30}; {239 ≤ 100; x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 239}
This new goal has been obtained by picking one particular substitution σ =
[239/z] (out of multiple possible ones), which delivers two identical heaplets of the
form x 7→ 239 in pre- and postcondition. It is time for the Write rule to strike to
fix the discrepancy between the symbolic heap in the pre- and postcondition by
emitting the command ∗y = 239 (at last, some executable code!), and resulting in
the following new goal (notice the change of y-related entry in the precondition):
{x, y} ; {x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 239}; {239 ≤ 100; x 7→ 239 ∗ y 7→ 239}
What follows are two applications of the Frame rule to the common symbolic
heaps, leading to the goal: {x, y} {emp} ; {239 ≤ 100; emp}. At this point, we
are clearly in trouble. The pure part of the precondition is simply true, while the
postcondition’s pure part is 239 ≤ 100, which is unsolvable.
Turns out that our initial pick of the substitution σ = [239/z] was an unfor-
tunate one, and we should discard the series of rule applications that followed
it, back-track and adopt a different substitution, e.g., σ′ = [30/z], which will
indeed result in solving our initial goal.8
Let us now consider the same specification for pick that has been enhanced
by explicitly annotating parts of the symbolic heap as mutable and read-only:{
x
M7→ 239 ∗ y RO7→ 30
}
void pick(loc x, loc y)
{
z ≤ 100; x M7→ z ∗ y RO7→ z
}
(5)
In this version of SSL, the effect of rules such as Emp, Frame, and UnifyHeaps
remains the same, while operational rules such as Write, become annotation-
aware. Specifically, the rule Write is now replaced by the following one:
8 One might argue that it was possible to detect the unsolvable conjunct 239 ≤ 100 in
the postcondition immediately after performing substitution, thus sparing the need
to proceed with this derivation further. This is, indeed, a possibility, but in general
it is hard to argue which of the heuristics in applying the rules will work better in
general. We defer the quantitative argument on this matter until Sec. 4.4.
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WriteRO
Vars (e) ⊆ Γ e 6= e′ Γ ;
{
φ; x
M7→ e ∗ P
}
;
{
ψ; x
M7→ e ∗ Q
}∣∣∣ c
Γ;
{
φ; x
M7→ e′ ∗ P
}
;
{
ψ; x
M7→ e ∗ Q
}∣∣∣ ∗x = e; c
Notice how in the rule above the heaplets of the form x
M7→ e are now anno-
tated with the access permission M, which explicitly indicates that the code may
modify the corresponding heap location.
Following with the example specification (5), we can imagine a similar scenario
when the rule UnifyHeaps picks the substitution σ = [239/z]. Should this be
the case, the next application of the rule WriteRO will not be possible, due to
the read-only annotation on the heaplet y
RO7→ 239 in the resulting sub-goal:
{x, y} ;
{
x
M7→ 239 ∗ y RO7→ 30
}
;
{
z ≤ 100; x M7→ 239 ∗ y RO7→ 239
}
As the RO access permission prevents the synthesised code from modifying the
greyed heaplets, the synthesis search is forced to back-track, picking an alterna-
tive substitution σ′ = [30/z] and converging on the desirable program ∗x = 30.
2.3 Composing Read-Only Borrows
Having synthesised the pick function from specification (5), we would like to
use it in future programs. For example, imagine that at some point, while syn-
thesising another program, we see the following as an intermediate goal:
{u, v} ;
{
u
M7→ 239 ∗ v M7→ 30 ∗ P
}
;
{
w ≤ 200; u M7→ w ∗ v M7→ w ∗ Q
}
(6)
It is clear that, modulo the names of the variables, we can synthesise a part of
the desired program by emitting a call pick(u, v), which we can then reduce to
the goal {u, v} {P}; {w ≤ 200; Q} via an application of Frame.
Why is emitting such a call to pick() safe? Intuitively, this can be done because
the precondition of the spec (5) is weaker than the one in the goal (6). Indeed, the
precondition of the latter provides the full (mutable) access permission on the
heap portion v
M7→ 30, while the pre/postcondition of former requires a weaker
form of access, namely read-only: y
RO7→ 30. Therefore, our logical foundations
should allow temporary “downgrading” of an access permission, e.g., from M to
RO, for the sake of synthesising calls. While allowing this is straightforward and
can be done similarly to up-casting a type in languages like Java, what turns out
to be less trivial is making sure that the caller’s initial stronger access permission
(M) is restored once pick(u, v) returns.
Non-solutions. Perhaps, the simplest way to allow the call to a function with a
weaker (in terms of access permissions) specification, would be to (a) downgrade
the caller’s permissions on the corresponding heap fragments to RO, and (b)
recover the permissions as per the callee’s specification. This approach signif-
icantly reduces the expressivity of the logic (and, as a consequence, complete-
ness of the synthesis). For instance, adopting this strategy for using specifica-
tion (5) in the goal (6) would result in the unsolvable sub-goal of the form
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{u, v} ;
{
u
M7→ 30 ∗ v RO7→ 30 ∗ P
}
;
{
u
M7→ 30 ∗ v M7→ 30 ∗ Q
}
. This is due to the fact
that the postcondition requires the heaplet v
M7→ 30 to have the write-permission M,
while the new precondition only provides the RO-access.
Another way to cater for a weaker callee’s specification would be to “chip
out” an RO-permission from a caller’s M-annotation (in the spirit of fractional
permissions), offer it to the callee, and then “merge” it back to the caller’s full-
blown permission upon return. This solution works for simple examples, but not
for heap predicates with mixed permissions (discussion in Sec. 6). Yet another
approach would be to create a “read-only clone” of the caller’s M-annotation,
introducing an axiom of the form x
M7→ t a` x M7→ t ∗ x RO7→ t. This way, the created
component x
RO7→ t could be provided to the callee and discarded upon return since
the caller retained the full permission of the original heap. Several works on read-
only permissions have adopted this approach [9, 11, 13]. While discarding such
clones works just fine for sequential program verification, in the case of synthesis
which is guided by pre- and postconditions, incomplete postconditions could
easily lead to intractable goals.
Our solution. The key to gaining the necessary expressivity wrt. passing/return-
ing access permissions, while maintaining a sound yet simple logic, is treating
access permissions as first-class values. A natural consequence of this treatment
is that immutability annotations can be symbolic (i.e., variables of a special sort
“permission”), and the semantics of such variables is well understood; we refer to
these symbolic annotations as read-only borrows.9 For instance, using borrows,
we can represent the specification (5) as an equivalent one:{
x
M7→ 239 ∗ y a7→ 30
}
void pick(loc x, loc y)
{
z ≤ 100; x M7→ z ∗ y a7→ z
}
(7)
The only substantial difference with spec (5) is that now the pointer y’s access
permission is given an explicit name a. Such named annotations (a.k.a. borrows)
are treated as RO by the callee, as long as the pure precondition does not con-
strain them to be mutable. However, giving these permissions names achieves
an important goal: performing accurate accounting while composing specifica-
tions with different access permissions. Specifically, we can now emit a call to
pick(u, v) as specified by (7) from the goal (6), keeping in mind the substitution
σ = [u/x, v/y,M/a]. This call now accounts for borrows as well, and makes it
straightforward to restore v’s original permission M upon returning.
Following the same idea, borrows can be naturally composed through capture-
avoiding substitutions. For instance, the same specification (7) of pick could be
used to advance the following modified version of the goal (6):
{u, v} ;
{
u
M7→ 239 ∗ v c7→ 30 ∗ P
}
;
{
w ≤ 210; u M7→ w ∗ v c7→ w ∗ Q
}
by means of taking the substitution σ′ = [u/x, v/y, c/a].
9 In this regard, our symbolic borrows are very similar to abstract fractional permis-
sions in Chalice and VeriFast [21,27]. We discuss the relation in detail in Sec. 6.
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2.4 Borrow-Polymorphic Inductive Predicates
Separation Logic owes its glory to the extensive use of inductive heap predicates—
a compact way to capture the shape and the properties of finite heap fragments
corresponding to recursive linked data structures. Below we provide one of the
most widely-used SL predicates, defining the shape of a heap containing a null-
terminated singly-linked list with elements from a set S:
ls(x, S) , x = 0 ∧ {S = ∅; emp}
| x 6=0 ∧ {S = {v} ∪ S1; [x, 2] ∗ x 7→ v ∗ 〈x, 1〉 7→ nxt ∗ ls(nxt , S1)}
(8)
The predicate contains two clauses describing the corresponding cases of the
list’s shape depending on the value of the head pointer x. If x is zero, the list’s
heap representation is empty, and so is the set of elements S. Alternatively, if x
is not zero, it stores a record with two items (indicated by the block assertion
[x, 2]), such that the payload pointer x contains the value v (where S = {v} ∪ S1
for some set S1), and the pointer, corresponding to x + 1 (denoted as 〈x, 1〉)
contains the address of the list’s tail, nxt .
While expressive enough to specify and enable synthesis of various list-traversing
and list-generating recursive functions via SSL, the definition (8) does not allow
one to restrict the access permissions to different components of the list: all of
the involved memory locations can be mutated (which explains the synthesis
issue we described in Sec. 1.1). To remedy this weakness of the traditional SL-
style predicates, we propose to parameterise them with read-only borrows, thus
making them aware of different access permissions to their various components.
For instance, we propose to redefine the linked list predicate as follows:
ls(x, S, a, b, c) ,
x = 0 ∧ {S = ∅; emp}
| x 6= 0 ∧
{
S = {v} ∪ S1; [x, 2]a ∗ x b7→ v ∗ 〈x, 1〉 c7→nxt ∗ ls(nxt , S1, a, b, c)
} (9)
The new definition (9) is similar to the old one (8), but now, in addition to
the standard predicate parameters (i.e., the head pointer x and the set S in this
case), also features three borrow parameters a, b, and c that stand as place-
holders for the access permissions to some particular components of the list.
Specifically, the symbolic borrows b and c control the permissions to manipulate
the pointers x and x + 1, correspondingly. The borrow a, modifying a block-
type heaplet, determines whether the record starting at x can be deallocated
with free(x). All the three borrows are passed in the same configuration to the
recursive instance of the predicate, thereby imposing the same constraints on
the rest of the corresponding list components.
Let us see the borrow-polymorphic inductive predicates in action. Consider
the following specification that asks for a function taking a list of arbitrary values
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and replacing all of them with zeroes:10
{ls(x, S, d,M, e)} void reset(loc x) {ls(x,O, d,M, e)} (10)
The spec (10) gives very little freedom to the function that would satisfy it with
regard to permissions to manipulate the contents of the heap, constrained by
the predicate ls(x, S, d,M, e). As the first and the third borrow parameters are
instantiated with read-only borrows (d and e), the desired function is not going
to be able to change the structural pointers or deallocate parts of the list. The
only allowed manipulation is, thus, changing the values of the payload pointers.
This concise specification is pleasantly strong. To wit, in plain SSL, a similar
spec (without read-only annotations) would also admit an implementation that
fully deallocates the list or arbitrarily changes its length. In order to avoid these
outcomes, one would, therefore, need to provide an alternative definition of the
predicate ls, which would incorporate the length property too.
Imagine now that one would like to use the implementation of reset satisfy-
ing specification (10) to generate a function with the following spec, providing
stronger access permissions for the list components:
{ls(y, S,M,M,M)} void call_reset(loc y) {ls(y,O,M,M,M)}
During the synthesis of call reset, a call to reset is generated. For this
purpose the access permissions are borrowed and recovered as per spec (10) via
the substitution [y/x,M/d,M/e] in a way described in Sec. 2.3.
2.5 Putting It All Together
We conclude this overview by explaining how synthesis via SSL enhanced with
read-only borrows avoids the issue with spurious writes outlined in Sec. 1.1.
To begin, we change the specification to the following one, which makes use
of the new list predicate (9) and prevents any modifications in the original list.{
r
M7→ x ∗ ls(x, S, a, b, c)
}
listcopy(r)
{
r
M7→ y ∗ ls(x, S, a, b, c) ∗ ls(y, S,M,M,M)
}
We should remark that, contrary to the solution sketched at the end of Sec. 1.1,
which suggested using the predicate instance of the shape ls(x, S)[RO], our con-
crete proposal does not allow us to constrain the entire predicate with a single
access permission (e.g., RO). Instead, we allow fine-grained access control to
its particular elementary components by annotating each one with an individ-
ual borrow. The specification above allows the greatest flexibility wrt. access
permissions to the original list by giving them different names (a, b, c).
In the process of synthesising the non-trivial branch of listcopy, the search
at some point will come up with the following intermediate goal:
{x, r, nxt, v, y12} ;{
S = {v} ∪ S1; r M7→ y12 ∗ [x, 2]a ∗ x b7→ v ∗ 〈x, 1〉 c7→ nxt ∗ ls(y12, S1,M,M,M) ∗ . . .
}
;
{
[z, 2]M ∗ z M7→ v ∗ 〈z, 1〉 M7→ y12 ∗ ls(y12, S1,M,M,M) ∗ . . .
}
10 We use O as a notation for a multi-set with an arbitrary finite number of zeroes.
11
Variable x, y Alpha-numeric identifiers
Size, offset n, ι Non-negative integers
Expressione ::= 0 | true | x | e = e | e ∧ e | ¬e
Command c ::= let x = ∗(x+ ι) | ∗(x+ ι) = e | let x = malloc(n) | free(x)
| err | f(ei) | c; c | if (e) {c} else {c}
Fun. dict.∆ ::=  | ∆, f (xi) { c }
Fig. 2: Programming language grammar.
Pure logic term φ, ψ, χ, α ::= 0 | true | M | RO | x | φ = φ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ
Symbolic heap P, Q, R ::= emp | 〈e, ι〉 α7→ e | [e, ι]α | p(φi) | P ∗ Q
Heap predicate D ::= p(xi) 〈ek, {χk, Rk}〉
Function spec F ::= f(xi) : {P}{Q}
Assertion P,Q ::= {φ; P}
Environment Γ :=  | Γ, x Context Σ :=  | Σ,D | Σ,F
Fig. 3: BoSSL assertion syntax.
Since the logical variable z in the postcondition is an existential one, the greyed
part of the symbolic heap can be satisfied by either (a) re-purposing the greyed
part of the precondition (which is what the implementation in Sec. 1.1 does), or
(b) allocating a corresponding record of two elements (as should be done). With
the read-only borrows in place, the unification of the two greyed fragments in the
pre- and postcondition via UnifyHeaps fails, because the mutable annotation
of z
M7→ v in the post cannot be matched by the read-only borrow x b7→ v in the
precondition. Therefore, not being able to follow the derivation path (a), the
synthesiser is forced to explore an alternative one, eventually deriving the version
of listcopy without tail-swapping.
3 BoSSL: Borrowing Synthetic Separation Logic
We now give a formal presentation of BoSSL—a version of SSL extended with
read-only borrows. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 present its programming and assertion lan-
guage, respectively. For simplicity, we formalise a core language without theories
(e.g., natural numbers), similar to the one of Smallfoot [6]; the only sorts in
the core language are locations, booleans, and permissions (where permissions
appear only in specifications) and the pure logic only has equality. In contrast,
our implementation supports integers and sets (where the latter also only ap-
pear in specifications), with linear arithmetic and standard set operations. We do
not formalise sort-checking of formulae; however, for readability, we will use the
meta-variable α where the intended sort of the pure logic term is “permission”,
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Write
Vars (e) ⊆ Γ e 6= e′ Γ;
{
φ; 〈x, ι〉 M7→ e ∗ P
}
;
{
ψ; 〈x, ι〉 M7→ e ∗ Q
}∣∣∣ c
Γ;
{
φ; 〈x, ι〉 M7→ e′ ∗ P
}
;
{
ψ; 〈x, ι〉 M7→ e ∗ Q
}∣∣∣ ∗ (x + ι) = e; c
Alloc
R= [z, n]α ∗ ∗0≤i<n (〈z, i〉 αi7→ ei) ({y} ∪ {ti}) ∩ Vars (Γ,P,Q) =∅ z∈EV (Γ,P,Q)
R
′ , [y, n]M ∗ ∗0≤i<n (〈y, i〉 M7→ ti) Σ; Γ; {φ; P ∗ R′};{ψ; Q ∗ R}∣∣ c
Σ; Γ; {φ; P};{ψ; Q ∗ R}| let y = malloc(n); c
Free
R = [x, n]M ∗ ∗0≤i<n (〈x, i〉 M7→ ei) Vars ({x} ∪ {ei}) ⊆ Γ Σ; Γ; {φ; P};{Q}| c
Σ; Γ; {φ; P ∗ R};{Q}| free(x); c
Fig. 4: BoSSL derivation rules.
and Perm for the set of all permissions. The permission to allocate or deallocate
a memory-block [x, n]α is controlled by α.
3.1 BoSSL rules
New rules of BoSSL are shown in Fig. 4. The figure contains only 3 rules: this
minimal adjustment is possible thanks to our approach to unification and permis-
sion accounting from first principles. Writing to a memory location requires its
corresponding symbolic heap to be annotated as mutable. Note that for a pre-
condition
{
a = M; 〈x〉 a7→ 5}, a normalisation rule like SubstLeft would first
transform it into
{
M = M; 〈x〉 M7→ 5
}
, at which point the Write rule can be ap-
plied. Note also that Alloc does not require specific permissions on the block
in the postcondition; if they turn out to be RO, the resulting goal is unsolvable.
Unsurprisingly, the rule for accessing a memory cell just for reading purposes
requires no adjustments since any permission allows reading. Moreover, the Call
rule for method invocation does not need adjustments either. Below, we describe
how borrow and return seamlessly operate within a method call:
Call
F , f(xi) : {φf; Pf}{ψf; Qf} ∈ Σ R = [σ]Pf ` φ⇒ [σ]φf ei = [σ]xi
Vars (ei) ⊆ Γ φ′ , [σ]ψf R′ , [σ]Qf Σ; Γ; {φ ∧ φ′; P ∗ R′};{Q}| c
Σ; Γ; {φ; P ∗ R};{Q}| f(ei); c
The Call rule fires when a sub-heap R in the precondition of the goal can
be unified with the precondition Pf of a function f from context Σ. Some salient
points are worth mentioning here: (1) the annotation borrowing from R to Pf for
those symbolic sub-heaps in Pf which require read-only permissions is handled
by the unification of Pf with R, namely R = [σ]Pf (i.e., substitution accounts
for borrows: α/a); (2) the annotation recovery in the goal’s new precondition is
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implicit via R′ , [σ]Qf, where the substitution σ was computed during the uni-
fication, that is, while borrowing; (3) finding a substitution σ for R =[σ]Pf fails
if R does not have sufficient accessibility permissions to call f (i.e., substitutions
of the form a/M are disallowed since the domain of σ may only contain exis-
tentials). We reiterate that read-only specifications only manipulate symbolic
borrows, that is to say, RO constants are not expected in the specification.
3.2 Memory Model
We closely follow the standard SL memory model [32,37] and assume Loc ⊂ Val.
(Heap) h ∈ Heaps ::= Loc→ Val
(Stack) s ∈ Stacks ::= Var→ Val
To enable C-like accounting of dynamically-allocated memory blocks, we as-
sume that the heap h can also store sizes of allocated blocks in dedicated loca-
tions. Conceptually, this part of the heap corresponds to the meta-data of the
memory allocator. This accounting is required to ensure that only a previously
allocated memory block can be disposed (as opposed to any set of allocated
locations), and also enables the free command to accept a single argument,
the address of the block. To model this meta-data, we introduce a function
bl : Loc → Loc, where bl(x) denotes the location in the heap where the block
meta-data for the address x is stored, if x is the starting address of a block. In an
actual language implementation, bl(x) might be, e.g., x− 1 (i.e., the meta-data
is stored right before the block).
Since we have opted for an unsophisticated permission mechanism, where the
heap ownership is not divisible, but some heap locations are restricted to RO,
the definition of the satisfaction relation Σ,RI for the annotated assertions in a
particular context Σ and given an interpretation I, is parameterised with a fixed
set of read-only locations, R:
– 〈h, s〉Σ,RI {φ; emp} iff JφKs = true and dom (h) = ∅.
– 〈h, s〉Σ,RI
{
φ; 〈e1, ι〉 α7→ e2
}
iff JφKs = true and l , Je1Ks+ι and dom (h) = {l}
and h(l) = Je2Ks and l ∈ R⇔ α = RO .
– 〈h, s〉Σ,RI {φ; [e,n]α} iff JφKs = true and l , bl(JeKs) and dom (h) = {l} and
h(l) = n and l ∈ R⇔ α = RO.
– 〈h, s〉Σ,RI {φ; P1 ∗ P2} iff ∃ h1, h2, h = h1 ·∪ h2 and 〈h1, s〉Σ,RI {φ; P1} and
〈h2, s〉Σ,RI {φ; P2}.
– 〈h, s〉Σ,RI
{
φ; p(ψi)
}
iff JφKs = true and D , p(xi)〈ek, {χk, Rk}〉 ∈ Σ and〈
h, JψiKs〉 ∈ I(D) and ∨k(〈h, s〉Σ,RI [ψi/xi]{φ ∧ ek ∧ χk; Rk}).
There are two non-standard cases: points-to and block, whose permissions
must agree with R. Note that in the definition of satisfaction, we only need to
consider that case where the permission α is a value (i.e., either RO or M).
Although in a specification α can also be a variable, well-formedness guarantees
that this variable must be logical, and hence will be substituted away in the
definition of validity.
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We stress the fact that a reference that has RO permissions to a certain sym-
bolic heap still retains the full ownership of that heap, with the restriction that
it is not allowed to update or deallocate it. Note that deallocation additionally
requires a mutable permission for the enclosing block.
3.3 Soundness
The BoSSL operational semantics is in the spirit of the traditional SL [38], and
hence is omitted for the sake of saving space (selected rules are shown in App. A).
The validity definition and the soundness proofs of SSL are ported to BoSSL
without any modifications, since our current definition of satisfaction implies the
one defined for SSL:
Definition 1 (Validity). We say that a well-formed Hoare-style specification
Σ; Γ; {P} c {Q} is valid wrt. the function dictionary ∆ iff whenever dom (s) = Γ,
∀σgv = [xi 7→ di]xi∈GV(Γ,P,Q) such that 〈h, s〉ΣI [σgv]P, and ∆; 〈h, (c, s) · 〉  ∗
〈h′, (skip, s′) · 〉, it is also the case that 〈h′, s′〉ΣI [σev ·∪ σgv]Q for some σev =
[yj 7→ dj]yj∈EV(Γ,P,Q).
The following theorem guarantees that, given a program c generated with
BoSSL, a heap model, and a set of read-only locations R that satisfy the pro-
gram’s precondition, executing c does not change those read-only locations:
Theorem 1 (RO Heaps Do Not Change). Given a Hoare-style specification
Σ; Γ; {φ; P}c{Q}, which is valid wrt. the function dictionary ∆, and a set of read-
only memory locations R, if:
(i) 〈h, s〉Σ,RI [σ]P, for some h, s and σ, and
(ii) ∆; 〈h, (c, s) · 〉 ∗ 〈h′, (c′, s′) · 〉 for some h′, s′ and c′
(iii) R ⊆ dom (h)
then R ⊆ dom (h′) and ∀l ∈ R, h(l) = h′(l).
Starting from an abstract state where a spatial heap has a read-only permis-
sion, under no circumstance can this permission be strengthened to M:
Corollary 1 (No Permission Strengthening). Given a valid Hoare-style
specification Σ; Γ; {φ; P} c {ψ; Q} and a permission α, if ψ ⇒ (α = M) then
it is also the case that φ⇒ (α = M) .
As it turns out, permission weakening is possible, since, though problematic,
postcondition weakening is sound in general. However, even though this affects
completeness, it does not affect our termination results. For example, given a syn-
thesised auxiliary function F , f(x, r) :
{
x
a17→ t ∗ r M7→ x
}{
x
a27→ t ∗ r M7→ t + 1
}
,
and a synthesis goal Σ,F ; Γ;
{
x
M7→ 7 ∗ y M7→ x
}
;
{
x
M7→ 7 ∗ y M7→ z
}∣∣∣ c, firing theCall
rule for the candidate function f(x, r) would lead to the unsolvable goal Σ,F ; Γ;{
x
a′27→ 7 ∗ y M7→ 8
}
;
{
x
M7→ 7 ∗ y M7→ z
}∣∣∣∣ f(x, y); c. Frame may never be fired on
this new goal since the permission of reference x in the goal’s precondition has
been permanently weakened. To eliminate such sources of incompleteness we
require the user-provided predicates and specifications to be well-formed:
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Definition 2 (Well-Formedness of Spatial Predicates). We say that a
spatial predicate p(xi) 〈ek, {χk, Rk}〉k∈1..N is well-formed iff
(
⋃N
k=1(Vars (ek) ∪ Vars (χk) ∪ Vars (Rk)) ∩ Perm) ⊆ (xi ∩ Perm).
That is, every accessibility annotation within the predicate’s clause is bound by
the predicate’s parameters.
Definition 3 (Well-Formedness of Specifications). We say that a Hoare-
style specification Σ;Γ ; {P} c {Q} is well-formed iff EV (Γ,P,Q)∩Perm = ∅ and
every predicate instance in P and Q is an instance of a well-formed predicate.
That is, postconditions are not allowed to have existential accessibility annota-
tions in order to avoid permanent weakening of accessibility.
A callee that requires borrows for a symbolic heap always returns back to the
caller its original permission for that respective symbolic heap:
Corollary 2 (Borrows Always Return). A heaplet with permission α, either
(a) retains the same permission α after a call to a function that is decorated with
well-formed specifications and that requires for that heaplet to have read-only
permission, or (b) it may be deallocated in case if α = M.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented BoSSL in an enhanced version of the SuSLik tool, which we
refer to as ROBoSuSLik [12].11 The changes to the original SuSLik infrastruc-
ture affected less than 100 lines of code. The extended synthesis is backwards-
compatible with the original SuSLik benchmarks. To make this possible, we
treat the original SSL specifications as annotated/instantiated with M permis-
sions, whenever necessary, which is consistent with treatment of access permis-
sions in BoSSL.
We have conducted an extensive experimental evaluation of ROBoSuSLik,
aiming to answer the following research questions:
1. Do borrowing annotations improve the performance of SSL-based synthesis
when using standard search strategy [34, § 5.2]?
2. Do read-only borrows improve the quality of synthesised programs, in terms of
size and comprehensibility, wrt. to their counterparts obtained from regular,
“all-mutable” specifications?
3. Do we obtain stronger correctness guarantees for the programs from the stan-
dard SSL benchmark suite [34, § 6.1] by simply adding, whenever reasonable,
read-only annotations to their specifications?
4. Do borrowing specifications enable more robust synthesis? That is, should we
expect to obtain better programs/synthesis performance on average regardless
of the adopted unification and search strategies?
11 The sources are available at https://github.com/TyGuS/robosuslik.
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4.1 Experimental Setup
Benchmark Suite. To tackle the above research questions, we have adopted most
of the heap-manipulating benchmarks from SuSLik suite [34, § 6.1] (with some
variations) into our sets of experiments. In particular we looked at the group
of benchmarks which manipulate singly linked list segments, sorted linked list
segments and binary trees. We have manually modified the inductive definitions
which describe these data structures to use the more general concept of list
segments, as opposed to the original ones which solely employed the definition
of singly linked lists ending with null in their evaluation setup. We did not
include the benchmarks concerning binary search trees (BSTs) for the reasons
outlined in the next paragraph.
The Tools. For a fair comparison which accounts for the latest advancements
to SuSLik, we chose to parameterise the synthesis process with a flag that
turns the read-only annotations on and off (off means that they are set to be
mutable). Those values which are the result of having this flag set will be marked
in the experiments with RO, while those marked with Mut ignore the read-only
annotations during the synthesis process. For simplicity, we will refer to the two
instances of the tool, namely RO and Mut, as two different tools. Each tool was
set to timeout after 2 minutes of attempting to synthesise a program.
For the sake of this evaluation, we had to disable original SuSLik’s symmetry
reduction optimisation [34, § 5.3] for all the experiments, as it turned out to
be incomplete in the presence of new search strategies (restoring completeness
of this optimisation is orthogonal to this study, and hence left to future work).
Having this optimisation switched off resulted in slightly worse absolute perfor-
mance numbers for some of the “vanilla” benchmarks, compared to that reported
in the original work on SSL. It also required us to exclude the BST benchmarks
from the evaluation, as the synthesis of those did exceed the timeout for both
read-only and mutable versions of the corresponding specifications.
Criteria. In an attempt to quantify our results, we have looked at the size of
the synthesised program (AST size), the absolute time needed to synthesise the
code given its specification, averaged over several runs (Time), the number of
backtrackings in the proof search due to nondeterminism (#Backtr), the total
number of rule applications that the synthesis fired during the search (#Rules),
including those that lead to unsolvable goals, and the strength of the guarantees
offered by the specifications (Stronger Guarantees).
Variables. Some benchmarks have shown improvement over the synthesis pro-
cess without the read-only annotations. To emphasise the fact that read-only
annotations’ improvements are not accidental, we have varied the inductive defi-
nitions of the corresponding benchmarks to experiment with different properties
of the underlying structure: the shape of the structure (in all the definitions),
the length of the structure (for those benchmarks tagged with len), the values
stored within the structure (val), a combination of all these properties (all) as
well as with the sortedness property for the “Sorted list” group of benchmarks.
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Group Description
AST size Time (sec) #Backtr. #Rules Stronger
RO Mut RO Mut Mut/RO RO Mut Mut/RO RO Mut Mut/RO Guarant.
Linked
List
Segment
append 20 20 1.5 1.4 0.9x 8 8 1.0x 77 78 1.0x YES
delete 44 44 1.9 2.1 1.1x 67 67 1.0x 180 180 1.0x same
dispose 11 11 0.5 0.5 1.0x 0 0 1.0x 8 8 1.0x same
init 13 13 0.7 0.7 1.0x 5 5 1.0x 27 27 1.0x YES
lcopy 32 35 1.0 1.0 1.0x 9 14 1.5x 66 82 1.2x YES
length 22 22 1.5 1.5 1.0x 2 2 1.0x 38 38 1.0x YES
max 28 28 1.4 1.5 1.1x 2 2 1.0x 38 38 1.0x YES
min 28 28 1.5 1.5 1.0x 2 2 1.0x 38 38 1.0x YES
singleton 11 11 0.5 0.5 1.0x 8 8 1.0x 30 30 1.0x same
Sorted
List
ins-sort-all 29 29 3.7 3.8 1.0x 5 5 1.0x 60 60 1.0x YES
ins-sort-len 29 29 3.0 3.0 1.0x 7 8 1.1x 59 60 1.0x YES
ins-sort-val 29 29 2.6 2.5 1.0x 5 5 1.0x 57 57 1.0x YES
insert 53 53 7.8 8.0 1.0x 35 96 2.7x 214 338 1.6x YES
prepend 11 11 0.5 0.6 1.2x 1 1 1.0x 17 17 1.0x YES
Tree
dispose 16 16 0.4 0.5 1.2x 0 0 1.0x 10 10 1.0x same
flatten-acc 35 35 2.1 2.0 1.0x 24 24 1.0x 118 118 1.0x same
flatten-app 48 48 1.6 1.7 1.0x 14 14 1.0x 76 76 1.0x same
morph 19 19 0.6 0.5 1.0x 1 1 1.0x 24 24 1.0x YES
tcopy-all 42 51 1.5 2.2 1.5x 10 88 8.8x 85 296 3.5x YES
tcopy-len 36 42 1.3 2.0 1.5x 6 90 15x 72 304 4.2x YES
tcopy-val 42 51 1.4 5.3 3.8x 10 1222 122x 82 2673 32x YES
tcopy-ptr-all 46 55 1.6 2.4 1.5x 10 88 8.8x 93 303 3.3x YES
tcopy-ptr-len 40 46 1.3 2.2 1.7x 6 90 15x 80 311 3.9x YES
tcopy-ptr-val 46 55 1.3 5.8 4.5x 10 1222 122x 89 2679 30x YES
tsize-all 32 38 1.5 1.4 0.9x 2 4 2.0x 45 51 1.1x YES
tsize-len 32 32 1.2 1.1 0.9x 2 2 1.0x 44 46 1.0x YES
tsize-ptr-all 36 42 1.6 1.4 0.9x 2 4 2.0x 53 58 1.1x YES
tsize-ptr-len 36 36 1.3 1.3 1.0x 2 2 1.0x 52 53 1.0x YES
Table 1: Benchmarks and comparison between the results for synthesis with read-
only annotations (RO) and without them (Mut). For each case study we measure
the AST size of the synthesised program, the Time needed to synthesize the
benchmark, the number of times that the synthesiser had to discard a derivation
branch (#Backtr.), and the total number of fired rules (#Rules).
Experiment Schema. To measure the performance and the quality of the borrowing-
aware synthesis we ran the benchmarks against the two different tools and did
a one-to-one comparison of the results. We ran each tool three times for each
benchmark, and average the resulted values. Except for some small variations in
the synthesis time from one run to another, all other evaluation criteria remain
constant within all three runs.
To measure the tools’ robustness we stressed the synthesis algorithm by alter-
ing the default proof search strategy. We prepared 42 such perturbations which
we used to run against the different program variants enumerated above. Each
pair of program variant and proof strategy perturbation has been then analysed
to measure the number of rules that had been fired by RO and Mut.
Hardware Setup. The experiments were conducted on a 64-bit machine running
Ubuntu, with an Intel Xeon CPU (6 cores, 2.40GHz) with 32GB RAM.
4.2 Performance and Quality of the Borrowing-Aware Synthesis
Tab. 1 captures the results of running RO and Mut against the considered bench-
marks. It provides the empirical proof that the borrowing-aware synthesis im-
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proves the performance of the original SSL-based synthesis, or in other words,
answering positively the Research Question 1.
RO suffers almost no loss in performance (except for a few cases, such as the
list segment append where there is a negligible increase in time ), while the gain
is considerable for those synthesis problems with complex pointer manipulation.
For example, if we consider the number of fired rules as the performance mea-
surement criteria, in the worst case, RO behaves the same as Mut, while in the
best scenario it buys us a 32-fold decrease in the number of applied rules. At
the same time, synthesising a few small examples in the RO case is a bit slower,
despite the same or smaller number of rule applications. This is due to the in-
creased number of logical variables (because of added borrows) when discharging
obligations via SMT solver.
Fig. 5 offers a statistical view of the numbers shown in the table, where smaller
bars indicate a better performance. The barplots visually demonstrate that as
the complexity of the problem increases (approximately from left to right), RO
outperforms Mut ( the bars corresponding to Mut soar up compared to those of
RO).
Perhaps the most important take-away from this experiment is that the syn-
thesis with read-only borrows often produces a more concise program (light green
cells in the columnt AST size of Tab. 1), while retaining the same or better per-
formance wrt. all the evaluated criteria. For instance, RO gets rid of the spurious
write from the motivating example introduced in Sec. 1, reducing the AST size
from 35 nodes down to 32, while in the same time firing fewer rules. That also
means that we secure a positive answer for Research Question 2.
4.3 Stronger Correctness Guarantees
To answer Research Question 3, we have manually compared the correctness
guarantees offered by the specifications that are annotated with read-only per-
missions against the default ones - the results are summarized in the last column
of Tab. 1. For instance, a specification stating that the shape of a linked-list seg-
ment is read-only implies that the size of that segment remains constant through
the program’s execution. In other words, there is no need for the length prop-
erty to be captured separately in the segment’s definition. If, in addition to the
shape, the payload of the segment is also read-only, then the set of values and
their ordering are also invariant.
Consider the goal {lseg(x, y, s, a1, a2, a3)} ; {lseg(x, y, s, a1, a2, a3)}, where
lseg is a generalised inductive definition of a list segment which ends at y and
contains the set of values s. The borrowing-aware synthesiser will produce a
program which is guaranteed to treat the segment pointed by x and ending with
y as read-only (that is, its shape, length, values and orderings are invariant).
At the same time, for a goal {lseg(x, y, s)} ; {lseg(x, y, s)} assuming all list
components are mutable, the guarantees are that the returned segment still
ends in y and contains values s. Such a goal, however, does not disallow internal
modifications of the segment, such as reordering and duplicating list elements.
The few entries marked with same are programs with specifications which have
not got stronger when instrumented with RO annotations (e.g., delete). These
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Fig. 5: Statistics for synthesis with and without Read-Only specifications.
benchmarks require mutation over the entire data structure, hence the read-only
annotations do not influence the offered guarantees. Overall, our observations
that read-only annotations offer stronger guarantees are in agreement with the
works on SL-based program verification [9, 13], but are promoted here to the
more challenging problem of program synthesis.
4.4 Robustness under Synthesis Perturbations
There is no single search heuristics that will work equally well for any given
specification: for a particular fixed search strategy, a synthesiser can exhibit
suboptimal performance for some goals, while converging quickly on some others.
By evaluating robustness wrt. to RO and M specification methodologies, we are
hoping to show that, provided a large variety of “reasonable” search heuristics,
read-only annotations deliver better synthesis performance “on average”.
For this set of experiments, we have focused on four characteristic programs
from our performance benchmarks based on their pointer manipulation com-
plexity: list segment copy (lcopy), insertion into a sorted list segment (insert),
copying a tree (tcopy), and a variation of the tree copy that shares the same
pointer for the input tree and its returned copy (tcopy-ptr).
Exploring Different Unification Orders. Since spatial unification stays at the core
of the synthesis process, we implemented 6 different strategies for choosing a
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unification candidate based on the following criteria: the size of the heaplet
chunk (we experimented with both favoring the smallest heap as well as the
largest one as the best unification candidate), the name of the predicate (we
considered both an ascending as well as a descending priority queue), and a
customised ranking function which associates a cost to a symbolic heap based
on its kind—a block is cheaper to unify than a points-to which in turn is cheaper
than a spatial predicate.
Exploring Different Search Strategies. We next designed 6 strategies for priori-
tising the rule applications. One of the crux rules in this matter, is the Write
rule whose different priority schemes might make all the results seem randomly-
generated. In the cases where Write leads to unsolvable goals, one might right-
fully argue that RO has a clear advantage over Mut (fail fast). However, for
the cases where mutation leads to a solution faster, then Mut might have an
advantage over RO (solve fast). Because these are just intuitive observations,
and for fairness sake, we experimented with both the cases where Write has a
high and a low priority in the queue of rule phases [34, § 5.2]. Since most of the
benchmarks involve recursion, we also chose to shuffle around the priorities of
the Open and Call rules. Again, we chose between a stack high and a bottom
low priority for these rules to give a fair chance to both tools.
We considered all combinations of the 6 unification permutations and the 6
rule-application permutations (plus the default one) to obtain 42 different proof
search perturbations. We will use the following notation in the narrative below:
– S is the set comprising the synthesis problems: lcopy, insert, tcopy, tcopy-ptr.
– V is the set of all specification variations: len, val, all.
– K is the set of all 42 possible tool perturbations.
The distributions of the number of rules fired for each tool (RO and Mut)
with the 42 perturbations over the 4 synthesis problems with 3 variants of spec-
ification each, that is 1008 different synthesis runs, are summarised using the
boxplots in Fig. 6. There is a boxplot corresponding to each pair of tool and
synthesis problem. In the ideal case, each boxplot contains 126 data points cor-
responding to a unique combination (v, k) of a specification variation v ∈ V and
a tool perturbation k ∈ K. A boxplot is the distribution of such data based on a
six number summary: minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, maximum,
outliers. For example, the boxplot for tcopy-ptr corresponding to RO and con-
taining 90 data points, reads as follows: “the synthesis processes fired between
64 and 256 rules, with most of the processes firing between 64 and 128 rules.
There are three exception where the synthesiser fired more than 256 rules”. Note
that the y-axis represents the binary logarithm of the number of fired rules.
Even though we attempted to synthesise each program 126 times for each tool,
some attempts hit the timeout and therefore their corresponding data points had
to be eliminated from the boxplot. It is of note, though, that whenever RO with
configuration (v, k) hit the timeout for the synthesis problem s ∈ S, so did Mut,
hence both the (RO, s, (v, k)) as well as (Mut, s, (v, k)) are omitted from the
boxplots. But the inverse did not hold: RO hit the timeout fewer times than
Mut, hence RO is measured at disadvantage (i.e., more data points means more
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Fig. 6: Boxplots of variations in log2(numbers of applied rules) for synthesis per-
turbations. Numbers of data points for each example are given in parentheses.
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Fig. 7: Distributions of log2(number of attempted rule applications).
opportunities to show worse results). Since insert collected the highest number
of timeouts, we equalised it to remove non-matched entries across the two tools.
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Despite RO’s potential measurement disadvantage, the boxplots depicts it as a
clear winner. Not only RO fires fewer rules in all the cases, but with the exception
of insert, it is also more stable to the proof search perturbations, it varies a
few order of magnitude less than Mut does for the same configurations. Fig. 7
supports this observation by offering a more detailed view on the distributions
of the numbers of fired rules per synthesis configuration. Taller bars show that
more processes fall in the same range (wrt. the number of fired rules). For lcopy,
tcopy, tcopy-ptr it is clear that Mut has a wider distribution of the number
of fired rules, that is, Mut is more sensitive to the perturbations than RO. We
additionally make some further observations:
– Despite a similar distribution wrt. the numbers of fired rules in the case of
insert, RO produces compact ASTs of size 53 for all perturbations, while Mut
fluctuates between producing ASTs of size 53 and 62.
– For all the synthesis tasks, RO produced the same AST irrespective of the
tool’s perturbation. In contrast, there were synthesis problems for which Mut
produced as many as 3 different ASTs for different perturbations, none of
which were as concise as the one produced by RO for the same configuration.
A manual investigation of the synthesised programs revealed that all the extra
AST nodes produced by Mut are the consequence of spurious write statements.
– The outliers of (Mut, lcopy) are ridiculously high, firing close to 40k rules.
– The outliers of (RO, tcopy) are still below the median values of (Mut, tcopy).
– Except for insert, the best performance of Mut, in terms of fired rules, barely
overlaps with the worst performance of RO.
– Except for insert, the medians of RO are closer to the lowest value of the
data distribution, as opposed to Mut where the tendancy is to fire more rules.
– In absolute values, RO hit the 2-minutes timeout 102 times compared to Mut,
which hit the timeout 132 times.
We believe that the main take-aways from this set of experiments, along with
the positive answer to the Research Question 4, are as follows:
– RO is more stable wrt. the number of rules fired and the size of the generated
AST for many reasonable proof search perturbations.
– RO produces better programs, which avoid spurious statements, irrespective
of the perturbation and number of rules fired during the search.
5 Limitations and Discussion
Flexible aliasing. Separating conjunction asserts that the heap can be split into
two disjoint parts, or in other words it carries an implicit non-aliasing infor-
mation. Specifically, x 7→ ∗ y 7→ states that x and y are non-aliased. Such
assertions can be used to specify methods as below:
{x 7→ n ∗ y 7→ m ∗ ret 7→ x} sum(x, y, ret) {x 7→ n ∗ y 7→ m ∗ ret 7→ n + m}
Occasionally, enforcing x and y to be non-aliased is too restrictive, rejecting
safe calls such as sum(p, p, q). Approaches to support immutable annotations
permit such calls without compromising safety if both pointers, aliased or not,
are annotated as read-only [9,13]. BoSSL does not support such flexible aliasing.
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Precondition strengthening. Let us assume that srtl(x, n, lo, hi, α1, α2, α3) is an
inductive predicate that describes a sorted linked list of size n with lo and
hi being the list’s minimum and maximum payload value, respectively. Now,
consider the following synthesis goal:
{x, y} {y 7→ x ∗ srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M)}; {y 7→ n ∗ srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M)}.
As stated, the goal clearly requires the program to compute the length n of
the list. Imagine that we already have a function that does precisely that, even
though it is stated in terms of a list predicate that does not enforce sortedness:
{ret 7→ x ∗ ls(x, n, a1, a2, a3)} length(x, ret) {ret 7→ n ∗ ls(x, n, a1, a2, a3)}
To solve the initial goal, the synthesiser could weaken the given precondition
srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M) to ls(x, n,M,M,M), and then successfully synthesise a
call to the length method. Unfortunately, the resulting goal, obtained after hav-
ing emitted the call to length and applying Frame, is unsolvable:
{x, y} {ls(x, n,M,M,M)}; {srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M)}.
since the logic does not allow to strengthen an arbitrary linked list to a sorted
linked list without retaining the prior knowledge. Should we have adopted an
alternative treatment of RO permissions [9, 13] allowing the caller to retain the
full permission of the sorted list, the postcondition of length would not contain
the list-related heap component and would only quantify over the result pointer:
{ret 7→ x ∗ RO(ls(x, n, ))} length(x, ret) {ret 7→ n}
thus leading to the solvable goal below:
{x, y} ; {srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M)}; {srtl(x, n, lo, hi,M,M,M)}.
One straightforward way for BoSSL to cope with this limitation is to simply add
a version of length annotated with specifications that cater to srtl.
Overcoming the limitations. While the “caller keeps the permission” kind of ap-
proach would buy us flexible aliasing and calls with weaker specifications, it
would compromise the benefits discussed earlier with respect to the granular-
ity of borrow-polymorphic inductive predicates. One possible solution to gain
the best of both worlds would be to design a permission system which allows
both borrow-polymorphic inductive predicates as well as read-only modalities to
co-exist, where the latter would overwrite the predicate’s mixed permissions. In
other words, the read-only modality enforces a read-only treatment of the pred-
icate irrespective of its permission arguments, while the permission arguments
control the treatment of a mutable predicate. The theoretical implications of
such a design choice are left as part of future work.
Extending read-only specifications to concurrency. Thus far we have only inves-
tigated the synthesis of sequential programs, for which read-only annotations
helped to reduce the synthesis cost. Assuming that the synthesiser has the capa-
bility to synthesise concurrent programs as well, the borrows annotation mecha-
nism in its current form may not be able to cope with general resource sharing.
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This is because a callee which requires read-only permissions to a particular
symbolic heap still consumes the entire required symbolic heap from the caller,
despite the read-only requirement; hence, there is no space left for sharing. That
said, the recently proposed alternative approaches to introduce read-only an-
notations [9, 13] have no formal support for heap sharing in the presence of
concurrency either. To address these challenges, we could adopt a more sophis-
ticated approach based on fractional permissions mechanism [7,8,20,25,30], but
this is left as part of future work since it is orthogonal to the current scope.
6 Related Work
Language design. There is a large body of work on integrating access permissions
into practical type systems [5,16,42] (see, e.g., the survey by Clarke et al. [10]).
One notable such system, which is the closest in its spirit to our proposal, is
the borrows type system of the Rust programming language [1] proved safe with
RustBelt [22]. Similar to our approach, borrows in Rust are short-lived: in
Rust they share the scope with the owner; in our approach they do not escape
the scope of a method call. In contrast with our work, Rust’s type system care-
fully manages different references to data by imposing strict sharing constraints,
whereas in our approach the treatment of aliasing is taken care of automatically
by building on Separation Logic. Moreover, Rust allows read-only borrows to be
duplicated, while in the sequential setting of BoSSL this is currently not possible.
Somewhat related to our approach, Naden et al. propose a mechanisms for
borrowing permissions, albeit integrated as a fundamental part of a type sys-
tem [31]. Their type system comes equipped with change permissions which
enforce the borrowing requirements and describe the effects of the borrowing
upon return. As a result of treating permissions as first-class values, we do not
need to explicitly describe the flow of permissions for each borrow since this is
controlled by a mix of the substitution and unification principles.
Program verification with read-only permissions. Boyland introduced fractional
permissions to statically reason about interference in the presence of shared-
memory concurrency [8]. A permission p denotes full resource ownership (i.e.
read-write access) when p = 1, while p ∈ (0, 1) denotes a partial ownership (i.e.
read-only access). To leverage permissions in practice, a system must support
two key operations: permission splitting and permission borrowing. Permission
splitting (and merging back) follows the split rule: x
p7→ a = x p17→ a∗x p27→ a, with p =
p1+p2 and p, p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1]. Permission borrowing refers to the safe manipulation
of permissions: a callee may remove some permissions from the caller, use them
temporarily, and give them back upon return.
Though it exists, tool support for fractional permissions is still scarce. Leino
and Mu¨ller introduced a mechanism for storing fractional permissions in data
structures via dedicated access predicates in the Chalice verification tool [27].
To promote generic specifications, Heule et al. advanced Chalice with insta-
tiable abstract permissions, allowing automatic fire of the split rule and symbolic
borrowing [20]. VeriFast [21] is guided by contracts written in Separation Logic
and assumes the existence of lemmas to cater for permission splitting. Viper [30]
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is an intermediate language which supports various permission models, includ-
ing abstract fractional permissions [4,43]. Similar to Chalice, the permissions
are attached to memory locations using an accessibility predicate. To reason
about it, Viper uses permission-aware assertions and assumptions, which corre-
spond in our approach to the unification and the substitution operations, respec-
tively. Like Viper, we enhance the basic memory constructors, that is blocks
and points-to, to account for permissions, but in contrast, the Call rule in our
approach is standard, i.e., not permission-aware.
These tools, along with others [3,18], offer strong correctness guarantees in the
presence of resource sharing. However, there is a class of problems, namely those
involving predicates with mixed permissions, whose guarantees are weakened
due to the general fractional permissions model behind these tools. We next
exemplify this class of problems in a sequential setting. We start by considering
a method which resets the values stored in a linked-list while maintaining its
shape (p < 1 below is to enforce the immutable shape):
{p < 1; ls(x, S)[1, p]} void reset(loc x) {ls(x, {0})[1, p]}.
Assume a call to this method, namely reset(y). The caller has full permission
over the entire list passed as argument, that is ls(y, B)[1, 1]. This attempt leads
to two issues. The first has to do with splitting the payload’s permission (before
the call) such that it matches the callee’s postcondition. To be able to modify the
list’s payload, the callee must get the payload’s full ownership, hence the caller
should retain 0: ls(y, B)[1, 1] = ls(y, B)[0, 1/2]∗ ls(y, B)[1, 1/2]. But 0 is not a valid
fractional permission. The second issue surfaces while attempting to merge the
permissions after the call: ls(y, B)[0, 1/2]∗ls(y, {0})[1, 1/2] is invalid since the two
instances of ls have incompatible arguments (namely B and {0}). To avoid such
problems, BoSSL abandons the split rule and instead always manipulates full
ownership of resources, hence it does not use fractions. This compromise, along
with the support for symbolic borrows, allows ROBoSuSLik to guarantee read-
only-ness in a sequential setting while avoiding the aforementioned issues. More
investigations are needed in order to lift this result to concurrency reasoning.
Another feature which distinguishes the current work from those based on frac-
tional permissions, is the support for permissions as parameters of the predicate,
which in turn supports the definition of predicates with mixed permissions.
Immutable specifications on top of Separation Logic have also been studied by
David and Chin [13]. Unlike our approach which treats borrows as polymorphic
variables that rely on the basic concept of substitution, their annotation mech-
anism comprises only constants and requires a specially tailored entailment on
top of enhanced proof rules. Since callers retain the heap ownership upon calling
a method with read-only requirements, their machinery supports flexible aliasing
and cut-point preservation—features that we could not find a good use for in the
context of program synthesis. An attempt to extend David and Chin’s work by
adding support for predicates with mixed permissions [11] suffers from significant
annotation overhead. Specifically, it employs a mix of mutable, immutable, and
absent permissions, so that each mutable heaplet in the precondition requires a
corresponding matching heaplet annotated with absent in the postcondition.
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Chargue´raud and Pottier [9] extended Separation Logic with (non-fractional)
read-only assertions that can be freely duplicated or discarded. The intuition
for that is that the heap ownership is not transferred when calling a method
which requires read-only access. Their approach creates lexically-scoped copies
of the RO-permissions before emitting a call, which, in turn, involves discarding
the corresponding heap from the postcondition to guarantee a sound read-only
modality. Adapting this modality to program synthesis guided by pre- and post-
conditions, would require a completely new system of deductive synthesis since
most of the rules in SSL are not designed to handle the discardable read-only
heaps. In contrast, BoSSL supports permission-parametric predicates (e.g., (9))
requiring only minimal adjustments to its host logic, i.e., SSL.
Program synthesis. BoSSL continues a long line of work on program synthesis
from formal specifications [26, 36, 40, 41, 44] and in particular, deductive synthe-
sis [14,23,29,33,34], which can be characterised as search in the space of proofs
of program correctness (rather than in the space of programs). Most directly
BoSSL builds upon our prior work on SSL [34] and enhances its specification
language with read-only annotations. In that sense, the present work is also re-
lated to various approaches that use non-functional specifications as input to
synthesis. It is common to use syntactic non-functional specifications, such as
grammars [2], sketches [36,40], or restrictions on the number of times a compo-
nent can be used [19]. More recent work has explored semantic non-functional
specifications, including type annotations for resource consumption [24] and se-
curity/privacy [17,35,39]. This research direction is promising because (a) anno-
tations often enable the programmer to express a strong specification concisely,
and (b) checking annotations is often more compositional (i.e., fails faster) than
checking functional specifications, which makes synthesis more efficient. In the
present work we have demonstrated that both of these benefits of non-functional
specifications also hold for the read-only annotations of BoSSL.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have advanced the state of the art in program synthesis by
highlighting the benefits of guiding the synthesis process with information about
memory access permissions. We have designed the logic BoSSL and implemented
the tool ROBoSuSLik, showing that a minimalistic discipline for read-only per-
missions already brings significant improvements wrt. the performance and ro-
bustness of the synthesiser, as well as wrt. the quality of its generated programs.
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A Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of BoSSL is given below.
[OP−Write]
(JxKs + ι)∈dom (h) h′ , h[(JxKs + ι)→ JeKs]
∆; 〈h, (∗(x + ι) = e; c, s) · S〉 〈h′, (c, s) · S〉
[OP−Alloc]
y/∈dom (s) ∃l.bl(l) /∈ dom (h) ∀ i∈0. . .n − 1, (l+i)/∈dom (h)
s′ , s[y→ l] h′ , h ·∪ (bl(l)→ n) ·∪ [(l+i)→ ]
∆; 〈h, (let y = malloc(n); c, s) · S〉 〈h′, (c, s′) · S〉
[OP−Free]
l , JxKs n , h(bl(l))
h = h′ ·∪ (bl(l)→ n) ·∪ [(l+i)→ ]
∆; 〈h, (free(x); c, s) · S〉 〈h′, (c, s) · S〉
[OP−Call]
f(xi){c′} ∈ ∆ s′ , [xi → JyiKs]
∆; 〈h, (f(yi); c, s) · S〉 〈h′, (c′, s′) · (c, s) · S〉
The semantics is fairly traditional, except for the block accounting, reflected
in the rules Alloc and Free). A machine built over this model takes no decision
based on the borrows information, hence such a machine accepts more programs
than BoSSL. Moreover, in comparison to SSL, BoSSL conservatively narrows
the space of accepted derivations. Consequently, the termination results of the
former directly apply to the later.
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B Soundness
Theorem 1 (RO Heaps Do Not Change). Given a Hoare-style specification
Σ; Γ; {φ; P}c{Q}, which is valid wrt. the function dictionary ∆, and a set of read-
only memory locations R, if:
(i) 〈h, s〉Σ,RI [σ]P, for some h, s and σ, and
(ii) ∆; 〈h, (c, s) · 〉 ∗ 〈h′, (c′, s′) · 〉 for some h′, s′ and c′
(iii) R ⊆ dom (h)
then R ⊆ dom (h′) and ∀l ∈ R, h(l) = h′(l).
Proof. Our proof strategy is to prove that if Σ,RI holds and  modifies some
memory locations, then those locations are not in R. The theorem then follows by
induction on  ∗. For brevity, we only show the base cases for the heap update:
Case: Write. Assume that (1) 〈h, s〉Σ,RI [σ] 〈x + ι〉 α7→ ∗ P′, and also that (2)
∆; 〈h, (∗(x + ι) = e; c, s) · 〉  ∗ 〈h′, (c, s′) · 〉. Assuming in (1) that α 6= M,
contradicts the validity assumption of Σ; Γ; {φ; P}∗(x + ι) = e; c{Q}, therefore
α = M. By (i) and α = M, it follows that (3) (JxKs + ι) /∈ R. By (1) it fol-
lows that (4) h′ = h[(JxKs + ι) → JeKs]. Finally, by (3) and (4) it follows that
∀l ∈ R, h(l) = h′(l). In addition, since dom(h) = dom(h′), then from (iii) it
follows that R ⊆ dom (h′).
Case:Alloc. Assuming that ∆; 〈h, (let y = malloc(n); c, s) · 〉 ∗ 〈h′, (c, s′) · 〉,
it follows then that (1) ∀ i∈0. . .n−1, (l+i)/∈dom (h) and bl(l) /∈ dom (() h) and h′ ,
h ·∪ (bl(l) → n) ·∪ [(l+i) → ]. From (1) and (iii) we conclude that that
∀l ∈ R, h(l) = h′(l). In addition, since dom(h) ⊂ dom(h′), then from (iii) it
follows that R ⊆ dom (h′).
Case: Free. Assuming that ∆; 〈h, (free(x); c, s) · S〉 〈h′, (c, s) · S〉 we get (1)
h = h′ ·∪ (bl(l)→ n) ·∪ [(l+0)→ . . . (l+n − 1)→ ] (where l , JxKs and n ,
h(bl(l))): hence the values stored in the heap are not modified, and it is only left
to prove that R ⊆ dom (h′), i.e. that bl(l) /∈ R and (l+i) /∈ R for i ∈ 0 . . .n − 1.
By validity and (i), we have (2) 〈h, s〉Σ,RI [σ]([x, n]M ∗ ∗0≤i<n (〈x, i〉 M7→ ei)) ∗ P′.
The rest follows from (2) and the definition of satisfaction. uunionsq
Corollary 1 (No Permission Strenghtening). Given a valid Hoare-style
specification Σ; Γ; {φ; P} c {ψ; Q} and a permission α, if ψ ⇒ (α = M) then it is
also the case that φ⇒ (α = M)
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the soundness theorem which disal-
lows post-condition strengthening. uunionsq
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